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Abstract— This paper reveals errors within Norwich et 
al.’s Entropy Theory of Perception, errors that have 
broad implications for our understanding of perception. 
What Norwich and coauthors dubbed their 
“informational theory of neural coding” [1] is based on 
cybernetics, that is, control and communication in man 
and machine. The Entropy Theory uses information 
theory to interpret human performance in absolute 
judgments. There, the continuum of the intensity of a 
sensory stimulus is cut into categories and the subject is 
shown exemplar stimuli of each category. The subject 
must then identify individual exemplars by category. The 
identifications are recorded in the Garner-Hake [2] 
version of the Shannon “confusion matrix” [3]. The 
matrix yields “H”, the entropy (degree of uncertainty) 
about what stimulus was presented. Hypothetically, 
uncertainty drops as a stimulus lengthens, i.e. a plot of H 
vs. stimulus duration should fall monotonically. Such 
“adaptation” is known for both sensation and firing rate. 
Hence, because “the physiological adaptation curve has 
the same general shape as the psychophysical adaptation 
curve” [4], Norwich et al. assumed that both have the 
same time course; sensation and firing rate were thus 
both declared proportional to H. However, a closer look 
reveals insurmountable contradictions. First, the 
peripheral neuron hypothetically cannot fire in response 
to a stimulus of a given intensity until after somehow 
computing H from its responses to stimuli of various 
intensities. Thus no sensation occurs until firing rate 
adapts, i.e. attains its spontaneous rate. But 
hypothetically, once adaptation is complete, certainty is 
reached and perception ends. Altogether, then, 
perception cannot occur until perception is over. 
Secondly, sensations, firing rates, and H’s are empirically 
not synchronous, contrary to assumption. In sum, the 
core concept of the cybernetics-based Entropy Theory of 
Perception, that is, that uncertainty reduction is the basis 
for perception, is irrational. 
 
Index Terms—uncertainty, perception, Information 
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I. INTRODUCTION: PERCEPTION IN MAN AND MACHINE 
  Alan Turing [5] called computers “thinking machines”. 
They are designed from human thinking and inevitably 
emulate the brain to some degree, massive parallelism being 
one example. Men and machines are required to “learn”. 
Learning in man or machine is a process of reduction of 
uncertainty, achieved through perception. However, K.H. 
Norwich and co-authors have argued the converse: in their 
Entropy Theory of Perception, they model human perception 
as based upon uncertainty reduction. In the Norwichian 
approach, humans exist in uncertainty about their 
surroundings; the uncertainty is reduced by processing of 
sensory input by sensory receptors. Norwich’s theory was 
based upon cybernetics, defined by Wiener as “Control and 
communication in the animal and the machine” [6]. As such, 
the Norwich et al. approach might be applied to machines. In 
the animal, such as man, the control involves spiking 
neurons; in the machine, it involves pathways and processors 
in a control system. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND: THE ENTROPY THEORY OF PERCEPTION 
The Entropy Theory of Perception [7] (1975-present) 
encourages us to imagine a psychophysical absolute 
identification experiment in which a subject is exposed to 
stimuli randomly chosen from a set of stimuli made, for 
simplicity’s sake, to vary in only one dimension of its sensory 
attributes (e.g. decibels SPL but not frequency; or brightness 
but not hue). The subject must then name the category into 
which the stimulus falls, from a set of non-overlapping 
continua previously explained to the subject. For a set of 
transmitted symbols “k”, the stimulus information IS is 
 ( ) ( )∑−=
k
kplogkpI S             (1) 
 
where p(k) is the presentation probability of symbol “k”. The 
base of the logarithm is arbitrary; usually base 2 is used, 
giving information in “bits” (binary units) per symbol. 
The human responses (whether pooled across all subjects, 
or over a single subject; both methods are used) are recorded 
in an array of category (intensity) vs. category (response), the 
information transmission or “confusion” matrix. The latter 
relates transmitted (source) symbols to received symbols [2]. 
From it is calculated the stimulus equivocation, called “H” or 
ES, the information-theory uncertainty or “entropy” [8] about 
the attribute (e.g. intensity) of the stimulus: 
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The information transmitted, It, is 
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The upper limit to the transmitted information It is IS, when 
what is transmitted is identically received. 
The confusion matrix is assembled as follows. Let Njk be 
the number of times a symbol received as j was transmitted as 
k. Then Nj. is the total number of symbols received as j and 
N.k is the total number of symbols sent as k. Usually, the 
numbers of stimulus and response categories are the same, 
here called n. For simplicity, Norwich et al. assumed that the 
total number of symbols received overall equals the total 
number of symbols sent overall, called N. Hence altogether 
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and 
p(j) = Nj. /N = the probability of receiving j, 
p(k) = N. k /N = the probability of sending k, 
pk(j) = Njk /N. k = the probability of receiving j if k is 
transmitted, and 
pj(k) = Njk /Nj. = the probability of transmission of k, given j 
has been received. 
Entropy is a maximum Hmax when the stimulus is turned 
on, and with time drops to a lowest value Hmin. The difference 
Hmax - Hmin is the information transmitted. After that, the 
subject gains no substantial information. 
Early on, stimulus duration τ is just long enough to exceed 
sensory threshold, so that the subject can reliably tell that the 
stimulus is present, but assignment to the proper category is 
difficult. H is large, It is thus small. As the experiment is 
repeated, each time with a different τ, a set of data points 
{τ,H} builds up. This plot should fall monotonically and 
should resemble the drop in the perceived intensity of a 
maintained steady stimulus over time [4]. Indeed, Norwich 
[4, Fig. 1] refers to the plot of H vs. τ as “a psychophysical 
adaptation curve”, such that H represents sensation (also [9]). 
H does not drop to zero because even an infinitely long 
stimulus can be placed in the wrong category. Fig. 1 shows 
the supposed relations between H, IS, and It. 
The confusion matrix looks like this: 
Stimulus   category
!………………!
N 1 .N 1n…N 1k…N 12N 111
3=NN . n…N . k…N . 2N . 1
Column 
totals
N n .N nn…N nk…N n2N n1n
N j .N jn…N jk…N j2N j1j
!………………!
N 2 .N 2n…N 2k…N 22N 212
Response
category
Row 
totalsn…k…21
 
 
III.  CONNECTION TO THE FIRING RATE OF PERIPHERAL 
SENSORY NEURONS 
Exposing the isolated receptor with its primary afferent to 
a long, steady stimulus causes the firing rate to adapt. From 
an initial maximum, the rate drops smoothly and 
monotonically to a steady minimum [4], an equilibrium rate. 
The physiological adaptation curve has the same general 
shape as the psychophysical adaptation curve (Norwich et al., 
various papers). Fig. 2 shows this relation. Let us replace τ 
with t, where t is time after stimulus onset. Neuronal firing 
rate F(t), and stimulus equivocation ES (t), were hypothesised 
to obey 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) .0k,tEkspikes/stFhence
,tEtF
S
S
>⋅=
∝
    (5) 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Entropy H and information transmitted 
It vs. stimulus duration τ (after Norwich et al., 
various papers). If It = 0 then Hmax = IS. 
Information transmitted It is maximal when H 
is smallest, so that Hmin = IS ! It,max. 
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Fig. 2. Hypothetical adaptation curves (after Norwich et al., various papers). (Left) A psychophysical 
adaptation curve. (Right) A physiological adaptation curve. Norwich [4] noted the similarity in shape of the left 
and right curves, but supplied no time indices for the x-axes. 
 
Eq. (5) implies that sensation and neuronal firing rate 
change synchronously. Fig. 3 shows the relation of F for 
physiological adaptation to H for psychophysical adaptation, 
for several values of k, according to Eq. (5). 
The accumulation of certainty requires the eye, for 
example [10], or whatever the receptor [9], to have a 
memory. That memory will be finite, having a maximum that 
may not be big enough for F to reach zero [11]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Hypothetical time-dependence of 
entropy H and firing rate F for three values of 
k: k =1, k =0.3, and k =3 (after Norwich et al., 
various papers). 
 
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH THE ENTROPY THEORY’S 
INTERPRETATION OF PERIPHERAL SENSORY FIRING 
A. What Role for the Neuronal Confusion Matrix? 
A confusion matrix can be constructed from the firing of a 
neuron (e.g. [12]). Such a relation is not described in the 
Entropy Theory. Absolute identification by humans, which is 
so intrinsic to the Entropy Theory, is in fact irrelevant when 
computing neuronal It or H from spike counts. 
The neuronal Garner-Hake matrix is different from the 
psychophysical confusion matrix. The neuronal matrix 
requires the collection of firing rates in response to various 
levels of a stimulus; setting up the matrix requires the 
assignment of arbitrary criteria for neuronal response 
categories following the needed assumption of what 
particular aspect of firing constitutes the neuronal intensity 
code (e.g. [12]). Once the latter has been done, according to 
the Entropy Theory, the resulting computed H determines 
firing rates through F=kH. Thus either (i) the neuronal 
entropy, as computed from firing rates, is the same as the 
psychophysical entropy, as computed from absolute 
identifications, despite the differences in the ways in which 
the respective confusion matrices are in fact constructed, or 
(ii) the two kinds of entropies are unrelated. If the latter is 
true, then it is difficult to imagine how firing rate could be 
related to psychophysical entropy, but not to neuronal 
entropy. 
B. No Firing Without Computing Entropy, No Computed 
Entropy Without Firing 
If firing rate were to depend (according to Eq. (5)) on the 
computation of psychophysical H, then firing in response to a 
stimulus of a given duration could not occur until an 
absolute-identification experiment had been done for the 
given stimulus and duration - an experiment in which 
identification of stimuli would presumably be based upon the 
firing of sensory neurons! The time required to assemble the 
requisite confusion matrix and compute the entropy would be 
at least equal to the duration of the stimulus; as the stimulus 
duration increases, the time delay preceding firing will 
accordingly increase. 
Regardless, the neuronal information transmitted cannot be 
computed until after the neuron has responded to a variety of 
stimulus levels, just as the psychophysical H and It cannot be 
computed until an absolute judgment experiment has been 
performed. According to the Entropy Theory, perception 
requires uncertainty; no non-random neural firing means no 
uncertainty [10]. Perception ends when certainty is reached 
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[9], [13]; that is, from Eq. (5), F=0 when H=0. Thus, if there 
is no plateau in physiological adaptation - if, empirically, 
firing rate (and thus its presumed correlate, sensation) drops, 
in time, to the spontaneous firing rate - then any stimulus long 
enough to produce complete adaptation was never perceived 
at all. That is, firing rate could not commence until the 
stimulus was over and the confusion matrix completed, at 
which point complete certainty was reached, because firing 
rate had adapted down to the spontaneous rate. Hence, firing 
rate cannot depend on the computation of an adaptation curve 
from an absolute judgment experiment in the manner 
described by Norwich et al. Nor can it depend on the 
computation of H from a neuronal confusion matrix, which 
requires the stimulus-evoked responses of the neurons. 
C. Lack of Synchrony of Neuronal and Psychophysical 
Adaptation 
The Entropy Theory demands that entropy H, and 
sensation, and neuronal firing all adapt in synchrony. Table 1 
shows the observed level of psychophysical adaptation in 
man and of primary afferent firing rate adaptation in man or 
in animals. A response of “0” for psychophysical adaptation 
indicates no remaining stimulus-evoked sensation, and a 
response of 0 for neuronal adaptation indicates that 
spontaneous firing rate was achieved. Most “plateaux” are 
very slow decreases. 
Insofar as animal physiology can be taken as a model for 
man, Table 1 reveals a number of important differences 
between psychophysical and neuronal adaptation. For 
example, for the sense of taste, substances that evoke 
complete psychophysical adaptation in man can result in 
incomplete adaptation of firing rate in animals, such that 
adaptation across the species is hardly synchronous. In 
hearing and in vision, where response can adapt to a plateau, 
psychophysical adaptation in man can be much slower than 
adaptation of neuronal firing in animals. To generalize, then, 
sensation and neuronal firing need not adapt at the same pace, 
and one may adapt down to zero while the other may adapt to 
a nonzero plateau. Altogether, the Norwich et al. requirement 
of synchronous adaptation does not stand. 
Regarding the entropy H, the present author knows of just 
one published comparison of the adaptation of H to that of 
firing rate or sensation. In a landmark study, Ward [14] 
examined how H changed for an auditory stimulus, a 1-kHz 
tone, and for a visual stimulus, a flash from a light-emitting 
diode. Time was represented by stimulus duration. H’s were 
computed from absolute judgments of stimuli of different 
durations, made by human subjects. Fig. 4 compares the 
change in H with the change in primary afferent firing rates; 
Ward took the latter from the literature. For both the auditory 
stimuli and the visual stimuli, firing rate adapted more slowly 
than did H. The lag of F relative to H (represented by the 
horizontal separation between the F and H plots) is not 
constant; note that the time scale in each panel is logarithmic. 
Again, the Norwich et al. requirement of synchronous 
adaptation is not confirmed. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Norwich’s Entropy Theory of Perception proposes that the 
rate of firing of sensory neurons, along with its 
psychophysical correlate, sensation, are both used by the 
human body as inputs to the internal computation of 
information transmitted, It, and entropy, H. The Entropy 
Theory also posits that sensory-neuron firing and consequent 
sensations are both determined by It and H. Thus, firing and 
consequent sensation cannot happen until a series of just 
preceding neuronal firings and sensations has happened - but 
each of which, in principle, cannot happen until a series of 
just preceding neuronal firings and sensations has happened, 
and so on ad infinitum. That is, the Entropy Theory of 
Perception contains an inherent contradiction, which 
produces an infinity (and not the only infinity inherent in the 
theory; see [15]). All of this implies that the notion behind the 
contradiction, that of perception by uncertainty reduction, is 
unworkable and should be abandoned. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Entropy H and firing rate F, for audition and for vision (after [14]). 
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Table 1. Sensory adaptation (see text). Neuronal data are for single fibers unless noted as * for a 
summated or whole-nerve response, or as † for a few-fiber recording. 
 
Stimulus Species Reponse Time (s) Source 
Taste 
NaCl man 0 105 [16] 
sucrose man 0 105 [16] 
   
0.2 M NaCl man* 0 ≥ 60 [17] 
0.1 M NaCl cat* plateau 80 [18] 
0.003 M Q-HCl cat* plateau 80 [18] 
NaCl frog* plateau ≥ 20 [19] 
Q-HCl frog* 0 ≥ 20 [19] 
1M sucrose blowfly plateau 1 [20] 
Audition 
1 kHz man plateau 420 [21] 
   
0.875 kHz cat† plateau 120 [22] 
3-20 kHz moth 0 6 [23] 
60-500 Hz sculpin (fish) plateau 1 [24] 
1 kHz macaque plateau 0.14 [25] 
1.63 kHz cat plateau 2.5 [26] 
0.77 kHz cat plateau 0.1 [27] 
20 kHz moth plateau 5 [28] 
Olfaction 
H. sulphide man plateau ≈ 240 [29] 
coffee odor man 0 1 [30] 
eugenol man plateau 360 [31] 
   
menthol burbot (fish) plateau 120 [32] 
estragole salamander plateau 9 [33] 
Vision 
white light man plateau 60 [34] 
   
white light conger eel* plateau 1 [35] 
white light crab plateau 0.5 [36] 
white light cat plateau 0.5 [37] 
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